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OFFICER-DIRECTOR RELIANCE ON CORPORATION
COUNSEL'S ADVICE: A "GOOD FAITH" DEFENSE
IN CONFLICT OF INTEREST CASES*
TRANSAc'rIoNs between corporations and officers or directors with conflict-
ing interests I have long been rigorously supervised by the courts.2 In actions
brought on behalf of the corporation against officers or directors for waste or
negligence, plaintiff must overcome judicial reluctance to interfere with man-
agement's business judgment.3 But once plaintiff has shown a possible conflict
*Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956).
1. A conflict of interest may exist between directors and officers and their corporations
in three common factual situations: when the directors contract with the corporation for
salary or incentive compensation, Wight v. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321, 324 (4th Cir. 1916) ;
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 304, 60 A.2d 106, 109 (Ch. 1948);
when the director has an interest in another corporation which is dealing with his
corporation, Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378
(1918) (interlocking directorate) ; Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 237, 43 N.E.2d 18,
22 (1942) (same; but corporation charter contained provision, authorized by statute in
many states, permitting transactions between interlocked corporations) ; when the director
personally takes advantage of a business opportunity which the corporation might have
exploited, Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270-73, 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916 (Del. Ch. 1955), revld sub noma. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d
919 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1956). Courts and commentators frequently distinguish between
breaches of a director's duty arising from his dealing with the corporation on his own
behalf and those arising from transactions between management and third parties. The
latter type of breach is classified as the usurpation of a "corporate opportunity." See
3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDrA Or ColPoRATioNs § 884 (perm. ed. rev. 1947) (hereinafter cited
as FLErCHER).
2. Directors and officers are usually considered fiduciaries. 3 FLEcHER § 838; 3
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSS § 543 (1935) (hereinafter cited as BOGERT) ; UNIroam
FIDUCIArIES Acr § 1. Courts of equity accordingly undertake to insure that officers and
directors subordinate their personal interests to those of the corporation. Since a conflict
of interest may often involve an injury to the interests of the corporation, the courts
frequently apply very strict standards in these cases. STvms, PRIVAT CoRPoRAIioNs
§ 148 (2d ed. 1949) (hereinafter cited as STEvENs). For discussion of the remedies
available to the corporation see 4 PomERoy, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1075 (5th ed.
1941) (hereinafter cited as PoMrERov) ; note 29 infra.
3. Predicated on criticism of the managerial policies of the board of directors, actions
for waste and negligence are disfavored. Courts usually apply the "business judg-
ment rule" and refuse to appraise acts of the board of directors unless plaintiff proves
fraud, illegality or acts done ultra vires. The complainant also has the burden of proving
causation and all the other elements of his case. Otis v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp.
905, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1945); Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Ry., 49 N.j. Eq. 217, 23 Atl.
287 (Ch. 1891); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642 (Sup. Ct. 1944). See Carson,
Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 MICH. L. REv. 1125 (1942),
Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 431, 443
(1944); 13 FLETCHER §§ 5828, 5867 (perm. ed. rev. 1943). When plaintiff succeeds
in proving fraud or negligence the corporation may recover an amount equal to its loss.
WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 376 (rev. ed.
1951) (hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON & ROTHScHILD); 3 FLETCHER § 1029.
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of interest, courts frequently presume that any resulting transaction was in
breach of duty.4 Intended largely to prevent breaches of fiduciary duty by
deterring corporate officials from creating situations in which defections often
occur, this rule is frequently unrealistic.5 In many situations which present
possible conflicts of interests, the corporation's rights are circumscribed by
tax 6 or regulatory laws. 7 Corporate officers and directors consequently must
often rely on the advice of attorneys or other persons with expert knowledge
to determine whether the corporation has an interest adverse to that of its
officials. In these cases, a blanket presumption, denying reliance on expert
advice would not only be unrealistic," but would often deprive directors or
officers of reasonable profits honestly earned.9 Yet to excuse management
4. Once plaintiff has established facts which show a conflict of interest situation
and a profit made by the director, the burden of proving absence of a breach of duty is
placed on those seeking to uphold the transaction. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306
(1939) (dominant shareholder fixed his own salary) ; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 82, 87-88, 90 A.2d 660, 663, limited rehearing, 91 A.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1952)
(stock options issued to six out of nine directors); Solomine v. Hollander, 128 N.J.
Eq. 228, 275-76, 16 A.2d 203, 228 (Ch. "1940) (directors allegedly bought for themselves
business necessary to the corporation) ; cf. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.
1955) (controlling shareholder usurped "unmatured" corporate opportunity by selling con-
trol of corporation to a customer at a time when corporation might otherwise have ex-
ploited abnormal demand for its product). See Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1274 (1955);
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Co., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 306-07, 60 A.2d 106, 110 (Ch. 1948)
(president dominated board and profited from stock option authorized by board).
In a minority of jurisdictions there is a conclusive presumption that a conflict of
interest has resulted in a breach of duty to the corporation. See notes 26-27 infra.
5. Deterring future breaches is one of the primary purposes of the presumption. See
cases cited note 28 infra and accompanying text. The presumption is also thought to facili-
tate compensation of the corporation when it suffers a loss. But see notes 29-31 infra and
accompanying text. For indications that the rule is unrealistic, see STEVENS §§ 148, 149
147.
6. Truncale v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (corpora-
tion had possible tax deduction for the cost of its employee stock option plan which
directors waived for their own personal gain) ; Bookman v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
138 N.J. Eq. 312, 48 A.2d 646 (Ch. 1946) (same) ; WAS3HINGTON & ROTHScHiLD 411-12.
Cf. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 926 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1956), reversing Greene v.
Allen, 114 A.2d 916 (Del. Ch. 1955) (holding that tax considerations eliminated the
possibility of the corporation obtaining patent rights; therefore there had been no usurpa-
tion of a corporate opportunity).
7. State, as well as federal, antitrust laws may prohibit the corporation from acquir-
ing new business or properties. See, e.g., Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &
Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1940), modified, 263 App. Div.
97, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944) (Texas
antitrust law construed by director of parent and subsidiary as permitting parent, but not
subsidiary, to seize opportunity for expanding business).
8. Preston, Adzice of Counsel as a Defense, 28 VA. L. RFv. 26, 43 (1941) ; STEV'F s
§§ 148, 149.
9. The courts have recognized that corporate directors should, in certain situations,
seek and follow the advice of counsel. See, e.g., Bates Street Shirt Co. v. W~aite, 130
Me. 352, 369-70, 156 At. 293, 302-03 (1931) (advice of counsel who was an intrested
director, and of independent attorney, held to show directors' good faith although they
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whenever advice is obtained could well destroy the standards which courts
have developed to bring fraudulent and unscrupulous officials to account.10
The Second Circuit, presented with this dilemma in Spirt v. Bechtel,"
held that officer-directors who had acted with due care and good faith in
relying on the advice of counsel were not liable to the corporation. Two of
the defendants had authorized an agreement between the Treasury Depart-
ment and the corporation waiving the latter's claim to a tax deduction for
expense incurred under its employee stock option plan.12 The other de-
fendants had acquiesced in the waiver. As a result of the corporation's enter-
ing the agreement, the optionees under the plan, including the two authorizing
officer-directors and several of the acquiescing defendant directors, were then
entitled to treat their options as proprietary, rather than compensatory; their
profits were consequently taxable at capital gains rates rather than at the
higher rates applicable to ordinary income.' 3 The plaintiff, a shareholder
derived personal advantages); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(directors were negligent in not seeking advice of counsel before approving a plan
held to be ultra vires); Orient Inv. & Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C.
Cir. 1948), reversing 6 CCH Tax Ct. fem. 1 15546 (M) (1947) ("It was only natural
justice" to free officers of the corporation from liability when they relied on a competent
accountant's advice in a taxmatter) ; cf. In re Kohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 55, 33 A.2d 920
(1943) ; In re Wanamaker's Trust, 340 Pa. 419, 17 A.2d 380 (1941) (advice of counsel as
protection for the express trustee). But see Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916, 918 (Del. Ch.
1955), rev'd sub norn. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1956) (re-
liance on expert advice, admittedly necessary, was ineffectual to protect defendants who
had allegedly usurped a corporate opportunity). See, e.g., Simon, The Attorney-Client
Privilege As Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956).
10. The business judgment rule, applied when no conflict of interest exists, seldom
leads to liability on the part of directors. See note 3 supra; cf. Heller v. Boylan, 29
N.Y.S.2d 667, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
11. 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956), afflrming in part 129 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
12. The stock option plan had been approved by the shareholders in May, 1943. 232
F.2d at 243. Under its provisions eight officers, seven of whom were directors constituting
a majority of the board, were granted options. Brief for Appellants, pp. 7-10. Com-
missioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), was decided prior to the exercise of the options.
Immediately after this decision was announced, it was interpreted as giving the Com-
missioner the right to denominate all employee stock option plans as compensatory. T.D.
5507, 1946-1 Cusi. BuL. 18; WASHINGTON & RorHscHuLD 131-32. In that event, upon
exercise of the option the difference between the option price and the market price at
the time the option was granted would be taxable as ordinary income to the optionee and
deductible as salary expense by the corporation.
But in April 1946, I.T. 3795, 1946-1 Cum. BuLL. 15, was promulgated by the Com-
missioner, providing that, as to employee stock options granted before the Smith decision,
rulings as to the consequences of exercising these options might be obtained. Pursuant to
the advice of counsel, the president of the corporation (an optionee and director) requested
a ruling. Brief for Appellees, p. 12. The ruling stated that the plan was not clearly
compensatory. It further stated that it the corporation consented to waive its tax deduc-
tion and if all optionees also filed consents, the stock option plan would be treated as
proprietary rather than compensatory.
13. If the stock options were proprietary in nature, the transaction would be taxable
at the time the stock was sold, and then at capital gains rates. Malcolm S. Clark, P-H
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suing on behalf of the corporation, 14 alleged that in authorizing or consenting
to the corporation's waiver the defendant officers and directors had breached
their duty of loyalty to the corporation. 15 The defendants offered their reliance
on the advice of the corporation's counsel as evidence that the transaction
involved no conflict of interest and hence no question of loyalty, since, in
counsel's opinion, the corporation was not entitled to take the tax deduction.'0
The majority reasoned that the officer-directors were entitled to rely on this
advice and further that, since the transaction involved no conflict of interest,
the directors acted within the allowable limits of business discretion in elect-
ing to waive what seemed to them a doubtful claim.
17
In permitting the directors to rely on the advice of counsel, the court
followed a series of cases which have judged directors' conduct by objective
standards when determining whether a conflict of interest existed between
them and the corporation. Corporate opportunity cases, for example, have
been decided on the basis of a factual question such as: the extent of the
corporation's efforts to seek an opportunity like the one in question ;18 the
1950 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 50210; James M. Lamond, P-H 1946 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 46023;
Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938); WASHINGTON & RoTnscHilD 134.
14. Should directors refuse to bring suit, or should it appear plain that a request to
them to do so would be fruitless, as when suit is based on the corporation's claim against
a majority of the directors, a shareholder may bring a derivative action on behalf of the
corporation. See, e.g., FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (regulating the right to bring derivative
actions in the federal courts) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949); Levitan v. Stout, 97 F. Supp. 105, 111-15 (W.D. Ky. 1951); 13 FLETCHER §
5822; Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 649, 665-66 (1936).
15. 232 F.2d 241 at 245. See also Truncale v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 76 F. Supp.
465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (directors' waiver of corporation's claim to a tax deduction held
sufficient to establish a claim for relief); Riddle v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 147,
156, 59 A.2d 599, 604 (Ch. 1948) (directors have a duty to keep the corporation's liability
under the Internal Revenue Laws as low as that law permits); WASHINGTON & ROTHs-
cHILD 133, 411.
16. 232 F.2d at 242; Brief for Appellees, p. 12.
17. 232 F.2d at 247. If no conflict of interest is involved the courts invoke the normal
presumption used in cases of business judgment and will not interfere with the directors'
discretion unless the results raise the inference that no judgment, in fact, was exercised.
See note 3 supra. Absent proof of bad faith motivating their decision, directors breach
no duty by refusing to litigage a corporate claim; they may be protected by their refusal
to do so on the advice of counsel. BALLANTINE, HANDBOOK OF CORPORATIONS § 147 (1946)
(hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE) ; 4 COOK, CoR'oRATIONS § 750 (8th ed. 1923);
Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 37 N.Y.S.2d 404, 418 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
266 App. Div. 659, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't), af'd, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740
(1942) (disinterested directors' decision, based on the advice of the legal member
of the board, not to sue past and present directors, held sufficient defense against
a charge of fraud) ; Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 175-79, 240 P.2d 421, 427-31
(1952) (same); United Copper Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917)
(same).
18. Compare Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (the cor-
poration was seeking an opportunity like the one seized by the director, who used cor-
porate facilities in exploiting the opportunity), with Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309
Mass. 417, 422, 34 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1941) (negotiations to acquire property for cor-
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corporation's financial ability to take advantage of the opportunity;19 the
director's purchase of an opportunity and subsequent resale to the corporation
at a profit ;20 or even whether the situation presented a special or unique op-
portunity necessary to the corporation's business or growth.21 Thus, although
it is frequently said that the individual director's good faith is immaterial,
2
these and other conflict of interest cases seem to use objective tests of good
faith; they suggest that a conflict of interest can exist only when a reasonably
prudent director could not in good faith have acted as the individual defendant
did. And when no conflict exists, they hold that the director had no absolute duty
to refrain from realizing a personal profit. Spirt in effect continues the reason-
ing of these cases. 23 It adds reliance on the advice of counsel to the list of
poration had been discontinued several years before the defendant acquired similar
property for himself) ; Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429
(1935) (fact that company had once considered the purchase is not sufficient to con-
stitute "seeking").
19. Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 47, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721, 731 (1st Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 281 N.Y. 652, 22 N.E.2d 482 (1939) ; Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, 261 Fed. 933,
962-63, 965 (9th Cir. 1919) ; Hannerty v. Standard Theatre Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19 S.W. 82
(1892). But see Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935) (financial inability held to mean near insolvency, not merely
apparent inability to secure further credit).
20. Intent to resell to the corporation implies knowledge that the corporation is in
the market for the opportunity. New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y.
209, 219, 155 N.E. 102, 105 (1926) (when director buys land intending to resell to his
corporation, he must account to it for the profits) ; Durfee v. Durfee & Canning Co., 323
Mass. 187, 200, 80 N.E.2d 522, 529-30 (1948) (forming business with intent to resell its
product to the corporation diverts its profits) ; Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &
Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd on other grounds,
263 App. Div. 97, 115, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934, 953 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56
N.E.2d 705 (1944) (parent company held liable for not obtaining oil properties for the
subsidiary, and for reselling oil to the subsidiary at a profit) ; Lincoln Stores, Inc. v.
Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 423, 34 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1941) (alternate holding; officers not
liable for acquiring property without intent to resell to the corporation).
21. Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 274, 5 A.2d 503, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (secret
formula held to be essential to the corporation's business) ; Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d
667, 690 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (shares of stock which defendant directors bought held not to
have been desirable or necessary to the corporation) ; Solomine v. Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq.
228, 253, 16 A.2d 203, 218 (Ch. 1940) (alternate holding; alleged corporate opportunity
held to be unnecessary and extraneous to the purposes of the corporation). See Irving
Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935)
Note, 44 YALE L.J. 527 (1935).
22. See, e.g., Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Heise v.
Earnshaw Publications Inc., 130 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D. Mass. 1955); Levitan v. Stout, 97
F. Supp. 105, 117 (W.D. Ky. 1951) (dictum); Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 256 (2d Cir.
1956) (dissenting opinion, citing 3 BoGmT § 493, at 161; RESTATMUENT, TRusTs § 201
(1935)). Contra, Solomine v. Hollander, supra note 21, at 246, 16 A.2d at 215 (stating
that good faith is one of five facts which may negate the existence of a corporate
opportunity) ; cf. Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916, 920 (Del. Ch. 1955), rev'd sub non.
Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1956) (assuming but declining to decide
whether good faith would be a defense).
23. Authorities adopting objective tests of good faith disagree as to what the tests
should be. E.g., compare Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 502, 28
1957]
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objective tests of good faith applicable whenever a question of the existence
of a conflict of interest arises.
When reliance on advice of counsel is introduced to refute an allegation of
conflict of interest, an objective test of good faith strikes a reasoned mean
between two undesirable extremes. A subjective test of judging the individual
director's good faith 14 is unworkable. This approach too frequently requires
the courts to evaluate the business judgment or ability of corporate officials,
a duty which the courts are reluctant to assume because to do so would, they
feel, unreasonably inhibit honest directors from exercising their discretion.
The subjective test, consequently, may fail to safeguard the interests of the
corporation.
25
The other extreme, the strict rule of liability followed in a minority of
jurisdictions, is unjustifiable.26 Some courts conclusively presume that when-
ever a director has realized a profit from a transaction in which he acted both
for himself and for the corporation, he has breached his duty to the corpora-
tion.27 Apart from the fact that in areas in which reliance on expert advice
So. 199, 201 (1900) (only test is whether there is an existing interest or expectancy
on the part of the corporation in the property in question or whether officer's interference
will balk the corporation in effecting the purpose of its creation), with Solomine v. Hol-
lander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 247, 16 A.2d 203, 215 (Ch. 1940) (listing, in addition to the
criteria of notes 19 and 20 supra and accompanying text, whether director competes direct-
ly with his corporation); Comment, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 188, 189 (1943).
24. Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 687, 21
N.Y.S.2d 651, 731 (Sup. Ct. 1940), rev'd, 263 App. Div. 97, 115, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934, 953
(1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944) (all courts considered that
defendant directors had acted in good faith as individuals; lower court still held them
liable for usurping a corporate opportunity) ; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del.
Ch. 82, 87, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (reversing lower court which had based its
decision, in part, on directors' affirmation of their individual good faith).
25. The inability, whether real or self-imposed, of some courts to examine a decision
from the point of view of business conditions existing at the time, and their consequent
unwillingness to declare it unfair unless the results are grossly inequitable to the corpora-
tion, may leave unremedied results which are detrimental to the corporation and beneficial
to the directors. Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1932) rev'd, 289 U.S. 582,
591-92 (1933); Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 60 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1932), rev'd
other grounds, 288 U.S. 123, 150 (1933) ; Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp.
Co., 263 App. Div. 97, 122, 31 N.Y.S.2d 934, 959 (1st Dep't 1941), afftd, 293 N.Y. 2Sl,
56 N.E.2d 705 (1944) ; Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 667, 680 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Judicial
refusal to reappraise the business situation thus creates an almost irrebuttable presumption
of good faith on the part of the directors. Even when the burden of persuasion on this
issue falls upon the directors, the shareholder's attempts to refute evidence of good faith
introduced by the directors have often been unsuccessful. WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD
375 & nn.45, 46, 416. But see Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916, 920 (Del. Ch. 1955), rev'd
sub nor. Johnston v. Greene, 121 A2d 919 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1956) (recognizing that to
adopt subjective test of good faith would place difficult burden on shareholder, but hold-
ing that directors failed to show good faith).
26. For more detailed discussions of this rule, and indications of the jurisdictions
where it is followed, see Notes, 39 CoLum. L. REV. 219 (1939) ; 44 YALE L.J. 527 (1935)
51 YALE L.J. 1034, 1038 (1942) ; BALLANTINE §§ 67, 72; 3 BOGERT §§ 543, 493.
27. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S.
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is absolutely essential this presumption fails to serve its primary purpose of
deterring breaches, 28 it hinders full compensation for breaches when they
actually do occur. For normally directors held liable under the constructive
fraud rule are required to pay over to the corporation the profit they realized.29
The Spirt situation illustrates but one of numerous conflict of interest situ-
ations in which the directors' profit may be less than the corporation's loss.30
To hold the directors liable for the larger amount when they have relied on
counsel would aggravate the harshness of the presumption.3' Moreover, which-
ever measure of damages may be applied, a conclusive presumption, while it
seems designed jealously to protect corporations, may actually harm them
by discouraging competent men from assuming responsibility as directors.
The Spirt holding, however, has neither of these disadvantages. Rather it
protects directors who have followed expert advice on appropriate occasions.
And, since it establishes a more discerning standard of breach of duty, it allows
the corporation to recover compensation for its loss when negligence or actual
fraud are present.
708 (1935) ; Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954). See STEVENS § 148,
at 678-79; Notes, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 472 (1955); 39 MicH. L. Rxv. 314 (1940).
28. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, supra note 27; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288
U.S. 123, 150 (1932) (dissenting opinion of Cardozo, 3.); BALLANTINE § 67; See
STEENS at 678; see also notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
29. If the director's realization of a profit or benefit from his dealings with the corpora-
tion, or from dealings with others in which his fiduciary position is involved, is deemed per se
a breach of duty, the director is ordinarily declared a constructive trustee of the property,
profits or proceeds, and ordered to convey to the corporation. 4 POMIEROY §§ 1049, 1050,
1053, 1089. Recovery thus is determined by benefit to the director rather than harm to
the corporation. Fleischhacker v. Blum, 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 665 (1940) (award to corporation of profits realized by an officer who used his
position to derive a bonus from a third party) ; Gamlin v. Gamlin Chemical Corp., 79 F.
Supp. 622 (W.D. Pa. 1948); Production Mach. Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E.2d
32 (1951).
When the director's liability is based on a finding of actual, rather than constructive,
fraud, the corporation may obtain compensatory damages equal to its loss. See note 3
supra. It seems unlikely, however, that courts would award compensatory damages
greater in amount than the gain realized by the directors unless they are found to have
committed actual fraud. See notes 18-23 mpra and accompanying text.
30. In Spirt it would be possible for the sum of the officer-directors' individual tax
savings to be less, as well as more, than the amount of the corporation's loss from its
failure to take a $1,200,000 tax deduction, depending on the individual income tax rates
of the officials in comparison to that of the corporation. See note 12 supra. Since the op-
portunity of which defendants availed themselves was not correlative with that which
might otherwise have been open to the corporation, the traditional restitutionary remedy
would not necessarily recompense the corporation for its loss. See Truncale v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); note 6 supra.
31. If the defendants in Spirt had been held liable for the corporation's loss, the amount
of liability would be commensurate neither with the advantages by which they had been
enriched, nor with the existence of actual fault on their part, since no finding of bad faith
had been made. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. See also Heller v. Boylan,
29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 667 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (court considered hardship to directors of requiring
them to refund payments on which they had already paid income taxes).
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The Spirt court, however, seems to suggest that when the corporation's
rights depend on questions of law reliance on any advice of any counsel would
protect directors. 32 Officials should be allowed to rely on a statement by the
corporation's counsel that the corporation has no interest in the particular
transaction, but the qualifications of counsel should be carefully scrutinized.
When the transaction involves a specialized area of law, particularly tax or
regulatory law, counsel should be experienced in that area. 33 In addition, two
factors may sometimes decrease the objectivity of counsel's advice. Frequently
counsel participate in formulating a corporate plan or course of action, and
in so doing they may base their decisions in part on nonlegal, business policy
considerations. Judgments formed in this manner may unduly influence these
participants if they are asked to give a legal opinion on the plan when it is
completed.3 4 And counsel may in some cases be prejudiced by their economic
interests; not only may they have a personal interest in the proposed transac-
tion,8 5 but they may be heavily dependent financially on the particular cor-
poration. In either case, counsel will have an incentive to give an opinion
which would, at the same time, approve the plan and protect those who sponsor
32. See Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 256 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
33. Aside from the usual requirements for the practice of a profession, academic train-
ing and admission by that profession to its membership, in the specialized regulatory fields
further accreditation is required. Eleven administrative agencies have enrolled bars and
formal requirements for admission to practice before them. Vom Baur, Representation
Before Administrative Agencies, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1297, 1305 (1955). In addition, an
amendment to the Canon of Ethics of the legal profession recognizes patent and admiralty
law as specialities. Joiner, Specialization in the Law? The Medical Profession Shows
the Way, 39 A.B.A.J. 539 (1953). See Lewis, What is Competent Tax Advice?, 28 TAxts
33 (1950); Hermax Co. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1949), affirming 11
T.C. 442 (1948) (in pleading reliance on the advice of counsel to establish good faith in
order to avoid tax penalties, the lay taxpayer must prove the competency of his tax
counselor). These and similar standards of accreditation should be considered by the
courts when deciding whether directors were justified in obtaining and following the
advice they received. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 8, at 26; ef. Note, 53 CoLUm. L. PRv.
374, 378, 385 (1953) (stating standards for and advocating reliance on the interpretation
of regulations by qualified government officials, as a protection from damages and penalties).
34. Preston, supra note 8, at 48. Thus, company or "house counsel," being involved
in business policy formulation, may be so identified with a proposal as to make it difficult
for them to objectively appraise its legal consequences. This is but one factor to be con-
sidered in determining the justifiability of reliance on their advice. Tweed, The Changing
Practice of Law, 11 RECORD OF Ass'N OF BAR OF CITY OF N.Y. 13, 20-21 (1956). But
see Davis, House Counsel; The Lawyer With A Single Client, 41 A.B.A.J. 830 (1955) ;
Berle, Changing Role of the Corporation And Its Counsel, 10 RECORD OF ASS'N OF BAR
OF CITY OF N.Y. 268, 278 (1955). Simon, supra note 9, at 957, 986-89 (suggesting that
corporate counsel should not serve as director's or officer's personal counsel).
35. Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 687, 21
N.Y.S.2d 651, 731 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (counsel, a director, was affiliated with the parent cor-
poration whose interests were alleged to be adverse to those of the complaining subsidiary).
Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950)
(house counsel differentiated from some outside firms only by organizational arrangements).
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it. 0 And this may occasionally be true of outside counsel who are heavily
dependent on the corporation, as well as house counsel.
3 7
Similarly, a director's reliance on the advice of counsel may be based on
a two-fold misunderstanding. The attorney's opinion can of course be of little
value if based on a misapprehension of the facts ;3s and when the opinion is
based on assumptions, it is of little value unless the assumptions are clearly
stated. The advice, moreover, may be too complex to be fully comprehensible
when stated orally. In addition, the facts given to the attorney and the result-
ing advice may be ambiguous. 39
These sources of misunderstanding can be eliminated when the advice of
counsel is embodied in an opinion letter. The letter should set forth the facts
upon which the opinion is based and the name of the corporate official furnish-
ing the information. The conclusions reached and the course of action advised
should also be fully stated, and the letter should be dated and signed. Apart
from the fact that these statements would simplify the problem of proving
what was said by the corporation and by counsel, the formality of such an
opinion letter would probably encourage both parties to insure that the relevant
facts have been thoroughly and fairly stated. More important, a lawyer, or
indeed any expert, knowing that his opinion not only will be relied upon, but
also will be examined in court and possibly published in the court's opinion,
36. Cf. In re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 430-31, 103 N.E.2d 721,
725 (1952). But see Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 369, 156 At. 293, 302
(1931) (directors protected in relying on "interested" counsel where independent advice
was also obtained).
37. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass.
1950). Although counsel's economic independence may thus be in issue, counsel would
not be required to make disclosures which would be useful to other attorneys or which would
restrict counsel's freedom to set the fees charged their clients. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2196, 2200, at 117, § 2212 (3d ed. 1940). Counsel who are independent could normally
offer oral testimony of the percentage of their income derived from, or time devoted to,
the defendant corporation and its directors. McCoamicx, EVIDENCE § 98, at 198 (1954) ;
6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra § 1911, at 606. If plaintiff attempts to oppose or impeach this
evidence by compelling counsel to produce their books, the cumulative evidence rule could be
used by counsel to keep their books out of evidence. See 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra §§ 1907,
1908(3). When the books are necessary to resolve any uncertainty, they could be shown
to the court alone. Cf. 8 id. § 2212.
38. See E. M. Green, 11 B.T.A. 278 (1928) ("It appears . . . that Green did not
turn over to counsel complete information with respect to his income . . . which indicates
to our mind that a part of the deficiences due . . . was due to fraud."); Genesee Valley
Gas Co., 11 T.C. 184 (1948) (failure affirmatively to question tax advisers as to alterna-
tives was wilful neglect).
39. If the directors have not in fact followed the advice of counsel, but have mis-
understood it and taken another course, they should not be protected by a presumption
of good faith raised by their mistaken reliance. See notes 41-42 infra and accompanying
text. Although normally directors are allowed to make such errors as a reasonably
prudent director might make without incurring liability, in this situation deviation from
the suggested course of conduct raises a question of the director's good faith in seeking
and obtaining advice, and it destroys the corporation's safeguard of having the directors
follow a course suggested in a reasonably competent legal opinion.
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can be expected to strive for objectivity.40 In fact, realizing that his objectivity
or competence may be questioned, the advisor may also be expected to consider
whether to disqualify himself.
When an opinion letter appears on its face to meet the requirements stated
above, it should be sufficient to sustain the officials' burden of showing that
they did not breach their duty to the corporation. 41 Similarly, advice not
formalized in an opinion letter should protect the directors if they can show
that the advice was objectively given on the basis of adequate information, and
that it was followed. In either event, however, this defense should be re-
buttable. The plaintiff should be permitted to introduce evidence tending to
show that the directors were not justified in relying on the advice because
they knew or should have known it was, for example, prejudiced or carelessly
given. This evidence should be weighed, along with the nature and seriousness
of any error discovered in the opinion, in order to determine whether the
directors acted in a reasonably prudent manner in seeking and accepting the
advice.42 This procedure seems adequately designed to protect the interests
of the corporation and, at the same time, permits honest directors confidently
to rely on competent advice. And by presuming that a formal opinion letter is
sufficient to justify action based upon it, the courts can encourage corporate
officials to seek considered advice whenever expert knowledge is needed to
determine whether a conflict of interest exists.
40. The corporate client should be permitted to introduce the opinion letter in evi-
dence even though counsel whose advice is embodied in the letter attempts to assert the
attorney-client privilege. The privilege is the client's and he may waive it. United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ; 8 WIGM RE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2292, 2321, 2327 (3d ed. 1940). See also, e.g., Matter of Robinson, 140 App. Div. 329,
336, 125 N.Y. Supp. 193, 199 (1st Dep't 1910) (an attorney, director of a corporation,
could not claim attorney-client privilege for information obtained as a director). If the
corporate client deliberately fails to follow the advice of counsel, after having secured an
opinion letter, the interested directors or officers could not claim a privilege with regard
to this communication on their part, unless they had clearly been consulting counsel alone,
and, in a personal capacity. Simon, supra note 9, at 988. And it might be a breach of
ethics for corporate counsel to serve as director's or officer's personal counsel. Id. at 957
& n.13.
41. See note 4 supra. If not rebutted, the opinion letter should thus be conclusive as to
defendants' loyalty to the corporation, negating an allegation that because conflicting
interests prejudiced their decision it was not reached in a manner consistent with the
business judgment rule. See note 3 supra.
42. For example, plaintiff should be permitted to show that the facts given the advisor
were not true and complete, that the advisor was not competent and objective, that the
advice was not given on the day stated, or that the advice was not in fact relied upon when
the directors decided to follow the course of action under attack. And he should, in addi-
tion, be permitted to show that the directors knew or ought to have known of any defect
established. But see, e.g., RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 383(b) (1933).
When such defects are established, the court should also consider: the excusability of
any error discovered in the advisor's opinion; and the money and time saved by the choice
of this advisor rather than one who met the test of independence.
[Vol. 66
